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Substantialisation and the
plurality of the self
This paper focuses on two broad categories of amenders of the classical self, namely
Kenneth Gergen’s abolition of the self and Charles Taylor’s transformation of the self.
After the heyday of behaviourism it became fashionable again to speak of “inten-
tions” as a cause of human action. Recent manifestations of this sometimes empha-
sise a holistic view and more often posit a coreless pluralism as the self. In the case
of Gergen, this attempt lapses into a monistic substantialisation of the relational side
of the self; in the case of Taylor, into a moderate dualism with the interpretative
capacity of the self taking the substantialised position. As an alternative I propose a
dimensional anthropology that sees the self as consisting of a coherent plurality of
dimensions of equal agency.
Versubstansialisering en pluraliteit van die self
Hierdie artikel fokus op twee breë kategorieë van amendeerders van die klassieke self
naamlik Kenneth Gergen (afskaffing van die self) en Charles Taylor (transformasie
van die self). Na die val van behaviourisme in die menswetenskappe het dit weer
mode geword om “bedoelings” as oorsaak van menslike gedrag te sien. Onlangse ma-
nifesterings hiervan beklemtoon soms ’n holistiese mensbeeld en, meer gereeld, ’n
kernlose pluralisme wat die self genoem word. Hierdie poging verval egter in die
geval van Gergen in ’n monistiese versubstansialisering van die relasionele kant van
die self, of, in die geval van Taylor, in ’n gematigde dualisme met die interpretatiewe
vermoë van die self in die versubstansialiseerde posisie. As alternatief stel ek ’n di-
mensionele antropologie voor wat die self sien as ’n samehangende pluraliteit van
gelyke agentsdimensies.
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Until the 1950s the explanation of human behaviour was do-minated by the “double-aspect” theory.1 The mental and thephysical were supposed to be two different and unconnected
dimensions. Anyone who tried to connect them was thought to be
committing a category mistake. Ouweneel (1984: 69-70) and Taylor
(1974: 17) explain that although this metaphysics is often seen as a
dualism, it is more correctly a “neutral monism”, which means that
the core substance of humans is supposedly unknown and thus neither
spiritual nor physical but nevertheless present in both aspects. Ac-
cording to Glas (1996: 91) and Scarrow (1981: 13) this means in
practice that when behaviour is explained in terms of reasons or inten-
tions, that behaviour is labelled action. When behaviour is explained
in terms of causes, it is understood as physical or bodily movement.
Importantly, according to behaviourism, “causes”, and thus observable
bodily movement, are seen as the core of any worthwhile scientific
explanation. Because of the dominance of the natural science para-
digm, behaviourism was destined to become the dominant type of
explanation.
However, during the 1960s opinion shifted towards a critique of
the double aspect theory, its unknown substance, and behaviourism.
The problem with behaviourism, say critics,2 is that it contradicts
our ordinary understanding that intentions do make a difference to
what happens in the physical world. An arsonist’s desire to see a
building burning and his ideas about how to accomplish this end can
bring about a devastating inferno. A consensus therefore arose ac-
cording to which a person’s reasons for his actions are seen as causes
of that action. Analysts3 argue that this critique brought about a
move from a substantialist to an actualist view. Classical substance
theory looked for an essence inside or behind observable behaviour
while actualism refers rather to “happenings”.
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1 This article is an expanded version of a presentation delivered at the Interna-
tional Conference on Language — Communication — Culture, 27-30 Novem-
ber 2002, at the University of Evora, Portugal.
2 Cf the critique of Scarrow 1981: 13-4, Landesman 1966: 339-40 and Taylor
1985a: 166-7.
3 Cf the remarks of Ouweneel 1984: 67-68, 70 and Taylor 1967: 210-1.
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One may nevertheless ask whether this shift represents a really
meaningful move away from the idea of a core substance. The current
trend is supposed to imagine the self as a centre-less (ie substance-
less) plural entity. Because this view leads in many instances to a
fragmented, pluralistic perspective, there are those who add that the
plurality must be unified.4 But the idea of unity once again opens the
door for strategies to reduce the self to some substance to create the
desired unity. The challenge is thus to imagine a plural but coherent
self that also side-steps substantialisation.
This article will focus on two clearly different kinds of current
thinking about the self, namely the radical abolition of the self of the
American psychologist Kenneth Gergen and the moderate transfor-
mation of the classical self proposed by the Canadian philosopher
Charles Taylor. Although I shall focus on their views on explaining
behaviour, my aim is to get behind this to their metaphysics of human
identity. In the process I will challenge what seem to me to be the
current obsessions about the human being, namely interpretative ca-
pacity and being a product of interpersonal relations.
1. Substantialisation
It is, however, necessary to explain the notion of substantialisation.
Related to this concept are terms like reductionism, reification,
monism and dualism, all of which indicate an intra-self relationship
in which one dimension of the self is seen as primary and the others
as dependent on this core or substance. According to analysts,5 “sub-
stance” as an object of definition began with Aristotle. He used the
word first as an indication of any concrete thing — his so-called
“primary substance”. However, his idea of a “secondary substance”
took popular predominance. This is the idea of a “universal form”
4 Krippner (1991: 133, 139), for instance, argues that the modern worldview was
still in the grip of a fragmented view of the human being. He sees a “corrective”
to this situation in what he calls ‘‘‘post-modern’ or ‘holistic‘ thought”. In this
holistic paradigm, he predicts, the “current dichotomies between ‘brain’ and
‘mind’, between ‘body’ and ‘psyche’, and between ‘matter’ and ‘spirit’ may be
resolved in favour of a systems-oriented interactionist model of consciousness”.
5 Cf Lacey 1990: 234; Moore 1960: 612-3; O’Connor 1972: 36-7, and Simons
1995: 480.
that makes the concrete thing the thing it is — thus giving sub-
stance the sense of essence as distinguished from accidence. The latter
popular meaning is probably determined by the pre-Socratic idea
that reality must be one and that anything real must exist universally.
One of the prominent senses of substance therefore became that of a
universal reality that is present in the variety of particular things.
But many questioned the idea that we can reduce everything that
exists to the same underlying substance, arguing that the different
existents are different because they are thoroughly different. This cri-
tique doubts that what is called a substance can be more than a mere
bundle of attributes (Lacey 1990: 235). The substantialist answer6 to
this critique affirmed the original Greek and Latin words (ie hyposta-
sis, hypokeimenon, substantia) which mean “standing under” and “that
which underlies something”; the notion of a substratum that under-
lies and supports its qualities. Importantly, substances are seen as ca-
pable of an independent existence while qualities and relations cannot
exist independently of the substance. Most modern philosophers,
however, saw the independence of substances as on a scale of relativity.
Aristotle’s critics had already pointed out that it is no more possible
for a substance to exist without qualities than for qualities to exist
without a substance. Modern philosophers like Spinoza and Leibnitz
also stated that, strictly speaking, only God could be seen as comple-
tely independent. O’Connor (1972: 39) therefore concludes quite
rightly that it “may well be that nothing in the universe is independ-
ent of all conditions”.
The postmodernist Mark Taylor explains the substantialist self as
typically that of Descartes’ cogito. This cogito emerges as a “‘thing’ that
thinks”. This makes the subject “a substance in which attributes in-
here”. This, Taylor (1987: 132) says, moulds the subject into a “dis-
crete ‘thing-in-itself’ that is only extrinsically and accidentally asso-
ciated with other subjects and entities”. He rejects this substantialism
as a metaphysical illusion because there is no such thing as a primary
substance that harbours the secondary traits; the “content of the
subject and the predicates is the same”. It is simply impossible to
indicate the self separately from its predicates.
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6 Cf Flew 1984: 344; Lacey 1990: 235; Moore 1960: 613; O’Conner 1972: 37-
40; Simons 1995: 482, 484, and Strauss 1978: 31.
Substantialisation is strongly related to and probably the cause of
most popular monisms and dualisms. Olthuis (1990: 24-5, 27-8) sees
both dualism and monism as being generated by one of the most ba-
sic concerns of human beings, namely the question about “the ultimate
origin, unity and basis of human life”. He explains that “the different
types of monism and dualism result because different dimensions or
modes of reality are fixed on as crucial and decisive”. This leads to
dualisms that conceive “of a particular mode and its attendant di-
mensions as being highest and the remaining dimensions as compri-
sing a lower reality”. Monisms, on the other hand, “choose a certain
mode as elemental and conceive of reality diverging and bifurcating
into higher and lower dimensions from out of this primordial unity”.
The point is that monisms identify one and dualisms two aspects as
basic to all other aspects.
This can indeed be explained by means of the concept of substan-
tialisation, or the view that a basic or core reality exists independ-
ently of other lesser and peripheral entities or modes of existence, are
nevertheless dependent on the substantive (underlying) reality. In
dualism two basic entities or modes of reality that exist independently
of each other, and also independently of everything else, are identi-
fied. One of the entities or modes is nevertheless identified as more
basic than the other. In the case of anthropological dualism, it is
usually the mind/self that is seen as more basic than the body or the
physical mode of human life. In the case of monism, all human
aspects are seen as emanations of the substantive mind/self. Clouser
(1991: 146-7) takes this analysis of monisms and dualisms further by
rejecting the underlying substantialisation when he argues that “we
never experience anything which is an exclusively physical body or
an exclusively nonphysical mind”. The implication of Clouser’s in-
tuition is that we cannot ascribe substance status to any aspect of the
human being. Moreover, if no aspect plays the role of a substratum,
all aspects are equally important in their qualification of the human
being and no permanent hierarchy can be discerned.
According to Simons (1995: 480-1) “substance” was the most
important concept for much of the history of metaphysics. The main
connotation throughout was that of a primary underlying reality (en-
tity or mode of existence) that could exist independently. With em-
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piricist criticism since Hume, as well as the “apparent irrelevance” of
the concept for modern science, substance has lost its central position
in metaphysics.7 However, Simons warns, while “ostensibly destroy-
ing the last remnants of traditional substance, Hume in effect shifted
it to perceptions — in his philosophy the independently existing
components of the universe”.
This return of substance, as I will argue shortly, is not an isolated
instance at all. Since substance is precisely what was criticised, one
can assume that it will now manifest itself in a less traditional way.
The traditional idea of substance ostensibly tends towards a reified
mode or dimension of reality that is seen as the primary component;
it is a “thing” that underlies everything else. Gergen’s obsession with
relations, and the prominence which Taylor gives to interpretation,
represent a more sophisticated substantialisation in the sense of not
altering the status of some mode or dimension of reality into some
reified object. However, the following five characteristics of the idea
of a substance remain. First, the core of everything that exists is re-
duced to the same element or mode. Secondly, the substance is the
origin or producer of all existents. Thirdly, the substance can exist in-
dependently of other modes of existence while the others remain
dependent on it. Fourthly and fifthly, the substance is the constant
and universal element in everything else.
2. Anti-substantialisation and social constructionism
Overcoming the tendency towards substantialisation should be one
of the priorities of the transformation of the concept of the self, as in
the postmodern meta-psychological theory of Kenneth Gergen.
Gergen (1990: 51-9) is critical of traditional monistic approaches.
Materialists, for instance, acknowledge only concrete material sub-
stances as real, which means that only observable, sensory causes of
behaviour count as legitimate objects of science. But, Gergen com-
plains, there is no clarity about what that “matter” is. Sophisticated
materialists posit the idea of an atom as the basic unit of matter. But
this is a hypothetical, indivisible and “beyond experience” entity,
which “has no purchase; it fails to inform”. For mentalists, on the
7 Cf also O’Connor 1972: 39-4); Lacey 1990: 236, and Simon 1995: 483-4.
other hand, only inner experiences are real. Here, solipsism is proba-
bly the biggest stumbling block: how can the mind cause physical
behaviour? The third monistic alternative is that of an unknown ba-
sic substance that can be known only inferentially, with the material
and mental world being seen as emanations of this basic reality.
However, the problem of the basic causal substance remains unresol-
ved. What causes the causal substance? Once this question is posed,
an unsolvable process of infinite regression is set in motion.
Gergen (1990: 59-62) thus questions the ultimate superiority, or
even the possibility of appointing one substantial reality as the base
for all others. Logically monism implies that if all is, for instance,
matter, then there is nothing that is not matter. But if there is no dif-
ference between matter and non-matter, the concept “matter” does
not carry any weight. Thus, for matter to be the underlying substance
demands a corresponding recognition of non-matter that is derivative
of or different from this substance. But such a derivative or opposite
reality cannot be recognised because this would negate the funda-
mental notion that all is matter. Gergen therefore concludes that one
cannot give serious credence to the attempt to appoint a basic reality
or substance — he rejects the substantialisation of the self. Moreover,
he seems to favour a structural plurality for the self. He explains that
all attempts to posit a substance are merely moves in the sphere of
social discourse. He therefore wants to affirm all substantialist dis-
courses because they are all “embedded in various social practices”
and to abandon any discourse would destroy its practice. One never-
theless gets the impression that “social discourse” takes a pivotal role
in his view of constituting the self. He says, for instance, that the
important question is not whether any notion of substance is correct
or incorrect. It is important to ask about the social practices sustained
by a particular discourse and whether we should continue to encourage
such practices via that discourse.
For Gergen (1991: 6-7, 19, 49, 140, 145-6; 1992: 61) this emphasis
on social discourse is the core of a postmodern condition that con-
fronts people with a multitude of relations and therefore with the
identities and life-styles of the people with whom they have relations.
This condition is supposed to come about because of the twentieth-
century technologies of communication and transportation, which
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enabled people to connect with and relate to many more others than
before, and much more frequently. This process of “populating the
self with others” means that today a wide array of different concepts
of the self is available to all. However, the more rivals there are for
the identity of the self, the more the borders of one’s own identity are
permeated. The idea of an “authentic self” recedes from view to be-
come a “no self at all”. Postmodern pluralism, says Gergen, throws
the “very concept of personal essences” into doubt and makes people
products of social construction.
However, by making a person the product of social construction,
Gergen’s apparent pluralism and non-substantialism turn substan-
tialistic because he implies that being human depends completely on
relations that construct the human being (relationism). The plurality
which Gergen has in mind is that of a constant (albeit changing) array
of relations. This, however, is not a plurality of modes of life able to
produce the self. For the latter purpose he seems to resort to a rela-
tional monism. But human beings are, after all, not only or even pri-
marily created by their social surroundings. People also produce
themselves by engaging in dialogue with their environment. More-
over, this dialogue also takes place with a plurality, that of the modes
of life that structure their lives. The influence of society is only one
of these modes, and cannot be reduced to others (like the physical,
biological, ethical and so on).
3. The roots and shortcomings of “social 
constructionism”
The substantialisation of the relational mode has deeper roots than
Gergen’s reference to postmodern circumstances indicates, and in fact
seems to be a radicalisation of Enlightenment naturalism. Gergen
(1991: 6, 20, 38, 41, 47; 1992: 60-1) describes the Romantic self as
“largely inborn, inherent in the natural instincts of the individual”
which gives each person “characteristics of personal depth: passion,
soul, creativity, and moral fiber”. Enlightenment modernism (Gergen’s
idea of the dominant view of the twentieth century) rejected this
deep self in favour of a “rational, well-ordered, and accessible” self. In
fact, it is a self “just slightly below the surface of his actions”. From
this perspective human behaviour is “largely the result of external
input”. Gergen (1991: 13, 44) claims that although the Enlighten-
ment self was still believed to be “self-directing”, its direction (being
inner-directed) is given to it in an other-directed fashion very early in
life by elders and kept in line by this inner implant. We cannot escape
the fact that we are the “products of a certain culture at a certain
point in its history”. The difference between postmodern times and
Enlightenment modernism, Gergen (1991: 7, 139, 145-6) suggests,
is that in the postmodern condition this construction by others is
hastened. In the postmodern world “persons exist in a state of conti-
nuous construction and reconstruction”.
However, Gergen’s fundamental assumption seems already to
have been outlined by the other-directed environmentalism and na-
turalism of behaviourism,8 which is still part of the scientism of the
Enlightenment.9 This makes Gergen’s root-paradigm of the non-self
older than postmodern relationism, or even the consciousness of a
postmodern condition. Gergen’s account is furthermore coloured by an
anti-atomist assumption which is also older than the postmodern
outlook and condition. He claims that modernism thinks that the
individual, as an autonomous agent, creates himself (Gerger 1987: 61-
3; 1991: 139, 146, 156-7; 1994b: 212, 214; 1999: 10, 11). Enlight-
enment modernists see individuals as the “fundamental units of
society”, which means that “relationships are secondary or artificial,
a byproduct of interacting individuals”. Gergen questions this assump-
tion because individualism “naturalizes alienation, self-absorption,
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8 The behaviourist B F Skinner (1972a: 200-1, 211; 1972b: 51-2) has argued
that the autonomous agent is rooted in the illusion of “the inner man, the ho-
munculus”. The homunculus, he says, is a “device used to explain what we can-
not explain in any other way”. However, says Skinner, “as our understanding
increases, the very stuff of which he is composed vanishes”. Then we can turn
“from the inferred to the observed, from the miraculous to the natural, from the
inaccessible to the manipulable”.
9 Russell & Gaubatz (1995: 389) also think Gergen’s dismissal of the Cartesian self
is older than postmodernism. Psychologies like behaviourism, cognitive science
and systems theory “all seriously contest the content and usefulness of the Carte-
sian construct of the self”. These theories are labelled “scientific”, which is another
way of saying that they harbour the sentiments of Enlightenment modernism.
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and a conflict of all against all”. He therefore reiterates his relationist
ontology, which sees personal identity as something that is “created
and re-created in relationships”. If there is “no self outside a system
of meaning, it may be said that relations precede and are more fun-
damental than self”. But this collectivist idea of the self is not the
invention of twentieth-century postmodernism.10 Gergen’s account
of the postmodern condition as the primary cause of the end of the
individual self thus to an extent begs the question. He departs from
a relationist assumption that foreshadows the conclusion of his ana-
lysis of the postmodern condition, namely that the postmodern self
is a social construct.
The important message that Gergen underlines is that the indivi-
dual cannot be seen as the product of his own creation (ie the sub-
stantialisation of human individuality). Moreover, he makes us aware
that the current self is at least partially a “construction” peculiar to the
technological age. However, the standard critique11 of views (such as
Gergen’s), which restrict the study of the human being to outer
conditions, is against their substantialisation in the human condition
of causal conditions that leave no room for personal components or
abilities such as thoughts, feelings, purposes and perceptions.
We may go even further to get the substantialisation of Gergen
into sharper focus. Clouser (1991: 143, 151, 153) refers to two kinds
of popular reductionism in psychology, namely those which explain
all behaviour “by biology or physics”, and those which explain it “so-
ciologically”.12 We can locate Gergen’s thought in the latter category.
The argument of social monists is that although we have a genetic
make-up and other biological givens, the kind of society we live in
determines how we use these capacities. In fact, “the needs of society
are to be regarded as paramount, and the individual must adjust to them”.
10 Gergen (1999: 10) indeed acknowledges that “attempts to conceptualize the in-
dividual as a social actor have long been fixtures on the intellectual landscape”.
11 Cf the critique of Botha 1990: 132; Clouser 1991: 144-6; Evans 1979: 25-7, and
Stevenson 1981: 97, 102.
12 It should be mentioned here that B F Skinner’s (1972a: 198-9) rejection of the
self was not only due to naturalistic motives. He also professed a kind of social
constructivism and even saw the pluralism of the human condition as contribut-
ing to the demise of the self.
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However, these kinds of “environmentalist” monisms are, accord-
ing to Clouser (1991: 149), riddled with inconsistency. For instance,
behaviourists take conditioning by the environment to be a universal
or transcendental condition. Yet for this law to continue, there must
be something like “an enduring disposition or tendency” in the human
being. But this would be to ascribe the very “inner state” that beha-
viourists “wanted to ban from psychology”. In fact, all of modernism
harbours within itself this dialectic between the personality ideal and
scientism.13 The problem with behaviourism, says Taylor (1985a:
125-6), is that it “could not cope with the purposeful, intelligent be-
haviour even of rats, let alone men”. When faced with the “insightful
and innovative behaviour of some mammals”, behaviourism starts to
use “ad hoc hypotheses”, which “include the dimensions of purpose
and cognition they were meant to exclude”. For Taylor, this is a clear
sign that behaviourism was “on the wrong track”.
Gergen also suggests that the social monism of the older genera-
tion is still riddled with relics of the inner self. Like Taylor, he re-
marks on behaviourism that “the strong presumption prevails that
the individual is endowed with certain psychological structures or
processes”, which means that the “mental fundament” is not really
“extinguished or transformed” (Gergen 1987: 60; 1999: 11-4), but
that there is a return of the self in behaviourism. A radical transfor-
mation, Gergen claims, is especially the trademark of his “social
reconstitution” of the self. In his social constructionism, “all that
may be said about mental process is derived from relational process”.
Here the “self-other” and the “individual/culture” dualisms are “vir-
tually destroyed”. This view says that the “social process serves as the
essential fulcrum of explanation” and “we may envision the elimination
of psychological states and conditions as explanations for action”.14
13 Even a personality theorist and forerunner of existential humanism like Gordon
Allport, who was criticised for “being unscientific”, and for “stressing internal
causes of behavior at the expense of external causes” (Hergenhahn 1980: 162-
3) to some degree rejected the idea of an inner self because it cannot be observed
(Allport 1968: 25, 32).
14 Gergen’s (1991: 146-57) distinction between the “strategic manipulator”, the
“pastiche personality”, and the “relational self” also portrays the gradual deve-
lopment into a postmodern non-self.
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Ironically, however, relational monism or relationism is a descrip-
tion that Gergen does not readily agree to as he still feels somewhat
guilty about not giving a place to concepts of mind. At one point Ger-
gen (1999: 6-8) says that the “critical voice of the constructionist
should not be viewed as liquidating” but that it only tries to esta-
blish functions that assume no truth “beyond culture and history”.
He therefore agrees that “the construction of new meanings must draw
from extant traditions” like the humanist tradition. He acknow-
ledges that “while problematic in its dualism and its individualism,
the demise of the humanist language of intention serves as a threat
to cherished cultural institutions (eg democracy, ethics)”. Further-
more, he welcomes all non-mechanist theories of human behaviour
that, despite “their realist predilections”, still “sustain and enrich lan-
guages that invest persons with special gifts, potential and powers”.
Gergen’s ploy to incorporate mental concepts into his social mo-
nism neatly fits Olthuis’s (1990: 25-7) and Ouweneel’s (1984: 68)
observation that “monists do not deny diversity and multidimen-
sionality, but that they account for diversity in terms of an original
and basic unity”. The strategic problem of monists is that of diver-
sity, which assumes the following question: “how, beginning with an
original oneness, can we account for difference, division and diversity?”
Indeed, despite positive remarks about the humanist tradition and
the value of mind-concepts, Gergen (1987: 63) maintains that there
“is good reason to press on toward a language of relationships”. He
finds it overwhelmingly problematic that the explanation of behaviour
in terms of individual selves and their intentions “help[s] to sustain
institutions in which competition, alienation, and isolation are central
features”. Moreover, he finds individualism politically unacceptable
because it leads us “to differentiate ourselves from other selves, to cast
the world in terms of us versus them”. For Gergen, this is enough
reason to push forward with relationism. However, the strong moral
stance behind this argument against disengagement presupposes a
kind of Romantic belief in a deep self endowed with moral capabili-
ties and a given normativity. But this is precisely what his relativistic
relationism tries to undermine. The point is that Gergen himself
does not manage to go beyond the return of the self and adherence to
an inner morality that his monism claims.
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4. Anti-substantialisation and interpretation
In distinction from Gergen’s monism, Charles Taylor’s explanation of
behaviour represents, according to some of his critics, a definite step
back towards dualism. They accuse him of the usual sins of dualism,
namely being unable to connect an illusionary human core (substance)
with the natural bodily existence of the human self and failing to
give natural existence a determining influence on human behaviour.15
However, Taylor’s naturalist critics are themselves not really in a po-
sition to solve the dilemma of connecting body and mind because
they argue from a monism that recognises only mechanistic explana-
tions of behaviour. They thus make agency a mere outgrowth of the
physical condition.16
The way to test Taylor on these issues is to ask whether he makes
use of the usual dualist strategies. In this regard Olthuis’s (1990: 25-
7) description of dualism17 is again functional. Dualists do not totally
ignore the notion of unity; rather, they account for it by trying to
relate “mutually irreducible and independent entities or processes”.
They therefore try to articulate a plausible interactionist or parallel-
list co-ordination between the parts of the human being. Although
15 De Sousa (1988: 431) argues that he finds himself “wondering whether Taylor’s
real motive for resisting naturalism is not itself a kind of dualism after all: a
deep-seated conviction that human beings are entirely different sorts of things
altogether from any other natural thing: that they are not part of nature at all”.
Landesman (1966: 342) seems to hold a similar position when he argues that
although Taylor’s argument “rejects the ghost in the machine, it often comes
close to positing some unique and mysterious connection between actions and
the desires which are reasons for actions”.
16 De Sousa (1988: 423, 431) states his materialistic monism when he says that
for agency to emerge “it is axiomatic that the same stuff is in our brain as else-
where, but put together differently”. He nevertheless acknowledges the “many
levels in our multi-layered understanding of the physical world” and argues that
there are “bridge laws” that make it possible for the “capacity for agency” to “be
emergent”. Landesman’s (1966: 345) critique also has the materialist bias with
intentionality still in the background. He states that “provided that such things
as desires and beliefs can be plausibly identified with certain physical states and
dispositions of animal organisms, there is no reason why physicalism cannot
employ teleological explanations”.
17 Cf also Ouweneel (1984: 69) for the same explanation.
dualists believe “that there is an ultimate split or division in reality”,
their strategic aim is to relate “what is lower to what is higher in
life”, that is “to achieve a measure of cooperation and integration be-
tween the disparate elements”. This can indeed be seen as Taylor’s
(1968: 128-7; 1970b: 89-91; 1985a: 174, 182) strategy when he argues
that “the realms of mind and matter [...] must be coordinated”, im-
plying that we need a “systematic relation” or a “conceptual conver-
gence” between intentional and mechanistic explanations. This state-
ment at least seems to confirm the existence of two fundamentally
and completely independent substances.18
Taylor, however, is seeking a way out of this cul-de-sac. Three broad
categories are currently visible with regard to the human being, namely
Cartesian dualism, materialism (monism), and a view that rejects both.19
The first option, Cartesian dualism or interactionism, is not viable in
any significant sense because it is not very credible in today’s Zeitgeist,
says Taylor. The assumption of two kinds of events that are in prin-
ciple able to exist next to one another but unconnected is to assume
the unacceptable notion that disembodied thinking and feeling are
indeed possible (Taylor 1967: 203-5; 1985b: 181-2). The second al-
ternative, materialism or mechanistic theory, still has a huge follow-
ing in current academia. Although these naturalists cannot avoid
talking about mental processes, they maintain that the mind should
be reduced to the behaviour of the human body (the brain). For
Taylor (1967: 201-3) this theory is unacceptable because it assumes
that mental events are simply “nomological danglers” which play no
role in the explanation of behaviour. This leaves a third group, to
which Taylor belongs, which rejects both classical dualism and natu-
ralistic physicalism. In its early years this was not so much a uniform
or self-conscious school of thought as the result of a “wide-spread
dissatisfaction with materialism” (Landesman 1966: 332).
According to Taylor (1970a: 60-2; 1967: 204, 210-2) naturalists
display a “strong resistance to explanation by purpose” because “it
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18 According to Clouser (1991: 147) dualism amounts to reducing the human
being to only two of its aspects; usually “the physical and the logical”. All other
human aspects are then dependent on these two. In fact, the “remaining aspects
can then be seen as generated by the interaction of minds and bodies”.
19 Cf the analyses of Scarrow (1981: 14) and Landesman (1966: 329).
seems to involve having recourse to the unobservable”. But this fear
of the unobservable is, according to Taylor, parasitic on the “dualistic
notion of body and mind as in causal interaction”. Dualism, he argues,
gives support to the “view that the mental could not be directly ob-
served; it could only be inferred from physical external behaviour”.
This implies that “once we have a dualist notion of body-mind inter-
action, we only need to suppress one term and we have behaviourism”.
This suppression is necessary for naturalists because “there is no room
for a mysterious agent”. However, Taylor believes that this is to create
a false dilemma: dualism is “the only other ontological hypothesis
which is admitted, which by its very absurdity gives behaviourism
its unchallengeable metaphysical credentials”. It is to have a choice
between a “machine with and one without a ghost”. Taylor envisions
a third alternative whereby we acknowledge the inevitability of the em-
bodiment of thoughts, emotions and so on. His alternative sees em-
bodiments as “vehicles of the thoughts and feelings concerned”.
Mind and body are not simply in interaction; they are vehicles for
each other. For Taylor this is not a dualism because dualism assumes
a mind with the possibility of functioning without the body.
Anti-independentism (and thus anti-substantialism) in relation
to human aspects also becomes clear in Taylor’s plurality of levels of
behaviour. His objection to the reductionism of naturalistic theory
correctly senses the monistic strategy as reducing everything to an
underlying substance: the “neuro-physiological” or the “physico-chemi-
cal” (Taylor 1970a: 73-4; 1985a: 182, 186). This level is seen by na-
turalists as “more basic” and its laws are seen to apply to a “wider
range of phenomena”. This means that the mental can be seen as a se-
condary level, whose “explanations must represent special cases” of the
lower level. In his rejection of this notion, Taylor argues that his own
conception “would, of course, involve an ontology with more than
one level”. He nevertheless claims that a dualism which “involves non-
interference between the two realms of mind and matter” is “par-
ticularly implausible”. The important difference from dualism, he
argues, is that “there is no clear-cut demarcation between the levels”;
there is plainly “a continuation between behaviours which are more
‘automatic’ and those which are more flexible”.
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Taylor clearly does not choose an independentist dualism or a mo-
nistic reductionism, both of which are the result of substantialisa-
tion. There is nevertheless a serious downside to Taylor’s view in that
he emphasises the human capacity for interpretation. In one of his
earliest studies Taylor (1980a: 54-8) remarks that a human activity
needs “something more” to identify it as action. This “something
more” is to be found in the “‘direction’ of an action” which can be
identified “independently of its antecedent condition”. This implies
that in systems that act, “agents”, or “directors” can be identified and
seen as “[loci] of responsibility”. He also identifies the locus of res-
ponsibility with the capacity for interpretation. Taylor acknowledges
that this “locus of responsibility” is linked to “a deep-seated and per-
vasive metaphor, that of the ‘inside’”. He agrees that this “inner” can
be seen as “another substance, different in kind to the observable
‘outer’ body and behaviour”. This would mean the “difference be-
tween those beings which are capable and those which are incapable
of action thus lies in the former having an additional entity over and
above their corporeal nature which the latter do not possess”. Taylor
does not agree with this substantialist interpretation and would rather
concentrate on the metaphor of “inside” as merely the locus of res-
ponsibility.
The problem with this locus of responsibility/interpretation is
not so much the fact that Taylor gives some kind of existence to this
form of agency but that it tends in the direction of becoming the ul-
timate origin of behaviour. He does not seem to think that a person’s
biological instincts, social circumstances, and so on can serve as equal
loci for directing behaviour in the appropriate circumstances and
instances.
5. Holism and interpretation
Taylor is not a mere pluralist either. He tries to hold on to the idea
that the distinction between the different levels of human behaviour
is merely a case of distinctions and not of separations. He adds to this
a suggestion of a mutual dependency between the various levels.
However, because he wants to escape naturalistic monism and also
dislikes a dualism of disconnectedness, his notion of co-ordinating
different levels of behaviour will remain a display of disengagement
if he is unable to show in any plausible way how the self and the
extra-self, intentions and mechanistic determinations inescapably
inter-relate. Taylor tries to do so with his claim that the explanation
of behaviour should take into account two additional elements (as dis-
tinct from the stimulus-response scheme of behaviourism) namely the
telos (goal) of the behaviour and the meaning which a situation has for
the agent.
Taylor (1980a: 5-9) rejects the straight intentionalist notion that
purposive explanations invoke a “separate” non-empirical or meta-
physical entity as the cause of any human behaviour.20 Taylor thinks
that the goal of any behaviour must be empirical and therefore ap-
points the “state of affairs” of both the system (the human agent) and
the outer environment to bring about the end in question. This
means, for instance, that the conditions of “an animal stalking his
prey, are (1) that the animal be hungry, and (2) that this be the ‘re-
quired’ action, ie the action in his repertoire which will achieve the
result — catching his next meal”. This description of the teleological
explanation of behaviour rests on the assumption that behaviour has
a strong holistic nature,21 in that Taylor thinks that extra-self and
inner-self circumstances can be woven together as the reason or cause of
behaviour.
Where then does the belief come from in the purpose of an agent
involving some independent entity, asks Taylor (1980a: 10-5)? This,
he says, is a relic of the empiricist tradition and assumes that “the
ultimate evidence for any laws we frame about the world is in the
form of discrete units of information”; that is, units “which [are] se-
parably identifiable from their connexions with any of the others”.
Atomists ask us to make “empirical connexions” between these sepa-
rate units. The problem of atomism is that it rules out “the possibi-
lity of construing purposiveness as a feature of the whole system”. If
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20 He formulates this intentionalist view as follows: it sees the behaviour of a
given system as explained by “laws of the form x=f(P), where ‘x’ is the behavi-
our and ‘P’ is the Purpose considered as a separate entity which is the cause or
antecedent of x”. In other words, behaviour is the function (f) of a particular
purpose. The problem with this picture, Taylor says, is that “no single propo-
sition about P is open to empirical confirmation or infirmation”.
21 Lemmens (1997:13) calls this a “socio-holistic view of human behaviour”.
“laws hold between discrete entities”, then “to invoke a purpose must
be to postulate some new discrete entity as a causal antecedent”. In
teleological laws, however, the
element of ‘purposiveness’ in a given system [...] cannot be identi-
fied as a special entity which directs the behaviour from within, but
consists rather in the fact that in beings with a purpose an event’s
being required for a given end is a sufficient condition of its occur-
rence.
Purposiveness is not the result of a “separable feature”, but a
“property of the whole system”.22 Taylor thus reiterates his belief that
the various dimensions of the human condition cannot be substan-
tialised; that they are fundamentally dependent on each other in ge-
nerating human behaviour, and that they therefore also mutually
define one another.
However, Taylor still needs to explain the co-operation of inner
states with outer states in establishing the goals of human agents. On
this point his explanations remain problematic. Taylor (1980a: 9-10;
1970a: 55) summarises his viewpoint as follows:
[The] condition of an event B [behaviour] occurring is, then, not a
certain state of P [purpose], but that the state of the system S and
the environment E be such that B is required for the end G, by
which the system’s purpose is defined.
This formulation leads Borger (1970: 83-5) to argue that Taylor’s
teleological antecedents seem to coincide with the behaviourist ex-
planation that attempts “to explain goal-directed behaviour as a pro-
duct of the stimulus situation”. It seems that for Taylor the one “clue
to” the explanation of goal-directed behaviour “is to be found in,
rather than outside the agent and has to do with his having intentions,
views, objectives”. But it also seems as if
Taylor wants to put part of the burden of explanation on special
teleological properties of situations because, like S-R theorists, he
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22 Taylor (1985b:22-23) argues elsewhere that “things only have meaning in a
field, that is, in relation to the meanings of other things”, which means that
“there is no such thing as a single, unrelated meaningful element”. The mean-
ing that contributes to an action is thus generated first because “a meaning is
for a subject”, secondly because “meaning is of something”, and thirdly because
things have meaning because they are interrelated.
feels the need for explanation in terms of antecedent conditions, yet
like them is not prepared to regard views and intentions as consti-
tuting such conditions.
Taylor (1980a: 62; 1970a: 56-7) anticipates the critique that his
teleological explanation of behaviour does not really offer an alternative
to the mechanistic description of behaviourism. But he argues that
this would be a fallacious assumption because there are “features of
the situation which are causally irrelevant”. Thus the important cause
needs to be identified which, in turn, means that the situation needs
to be interpreted; we are dealing with a “situation as seen by the
agent”. He gives the following example:
An accident occurs because the driver is drunk. However, the state
of affairs where the driver is drunk is also the state of affairs where
he is talking too much. But this does not mean that the state of af-
fairs where he is talking too much is the antecedent of the accident.
It can furthermore be said that “not all characterizations of an ante-
cedent which pick out its causally relevant aspects are on the same
footing”. For instance, it can be said that the antecedent was that the
driver had “imbibed the greater parts of the contents of a bottle with
a label marked ‘Canadian Club’”. However, this description is not as
basic as “the original description in terms of drunkenness” because
“other men get drunk and have accidents after drinking gin or scotch”.
Taylor (1970a: 59-60; 1970b: 91) thus adds that the situation in goal-
directed behaviour also assumes the intervention of the agent who
interprets the situation. It is essential that “we have to take account
of the way that the agent sees the situation”. This means that “an
important part of our explanations of human behaviour consists in
making actions intelligible by showing how the agent saw the situa-
tion, what meaning it had for him”.
However, this addition (interpretation) is again criticised for not
overcoming the disconnectedness between intentional and mecha-
nistic explanations of behaviour. In defending himself against the
critique that he seems like a behaviourist, Taylor is accused by some
critics of simply jumping to the other side of the divide. Sher (1975:
30-2) argues that the interpretative addition cannot be seen as “con-
junctive” to the ordinary goal-directed explanation because the “de-
termining condition for B [behaviour] is that B is seen to be required
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for G [goal]”; the determining condition is not “that B actually is re-
quired for G”. Sher therefore argues that “explicability in terms of
ordinary teleological laws will turn out to play no part in the analysis
of purpose”.
Taylor (1980a: 62) acknowledges that “the condition of an action
occurring is that it be believed to be adequate to the goal, and not
simply that it is in fact adequate”. Even more startlingly, he concedes
that “the two may not go together”; that the “situation as it really is
may differ from the situation under its intentional description for the
agent, that is, the intentional description may not in fact hold of it”.
Sher therefore suggests that we should see Taylor’s interpretative ad-
dition (the agent’s view of the situation) as the authentic Taylorian
position.23 This is in any case what Taylor (1970a: 58-69) seems to
say when he remarks that the human being is “limited in some way”;
that “there may be some more efficient way of getting G, but B is the
way of getting it which lies within the capacities of the being in
question”. Taylor initially warned that the goal of the agent’s beha-
viour should not be only a function of his mental capacity, his inten-
tion. However, he now seems in danger of making the goal funda-
mentally a function of the agent’s interpretation of the situation. Both
the inner and the outer conditions that are supposed to determine the
goal are to a great extent the products of interpretation.
This critique suggests that Taylor finds it difficult to uphold his
holistic or systemic assumption about the interconnectedness of the
various aspects of the human condition.24 This in turn means that he
runs the risk of substantialising the human capacity for interpretation.
In other words, the place he gives to interpretation in originating be-
haviour makes it possible for interpretation to stand on its own (not
120
Acta Academica 2004: 36(1)
23 Lemmens (1997: 13, 21) agrees that the hermeneutic concept of the self is cen-
tral to his holistic view of human behaviour. And Baier (1988: 589) sees in this
a return of dualism: “As persons we are claimed to exist only in self interpreta-
tion, and our personhood is sharply dissociated from ‘our organic being’, which
can be understood scientifically”.
24 Slote (1988: 585) has the same problem when he says that he finds it “perplexing”
that Taylor “frees attributions of mentality to persons from context-relativity in
a way that is quite surprising for someone otherwise so Hegelian in his approach
to philosophical issues”.
necessarily being dependent on the situation) while it remains the
one element on which everything else is dependent because interpre-
tation seems to be decisive in determining the goal of behaviour.
6. The dimensional self
As an alternative to Gergen and Taylor’s lapses into neo-substantial-
isation one could consider the idea of a dimensional anthropology,
which would see the self as consisting of a (structural) plurality of
agency dimensions that explain the variety in the behaviour of human
beings. The benefit of this idea is that it escapes the disengagement
between aspects or sides of the self caused by any substantialised
aspect of the self-substantialisation, which is of course one of the fun-
damental problems of all dualisms and monisms. A dimensional an-
thropology, however, sees the human being as consisting of a variety
of dimensions, sides, aspects and functions comparable to the sides of
a coin. It is impossible for a coin to consist of only one side — a one-
dimensional coin is unimaginable. It is equally clear that no one side
can be considered as basic to or even as more important than the others.
This, of course, is also a plural view of the self that may seem to
fit the spirit of postmodern pluralism which Gergen reflects in his
idea of a self saturated with the investments of a multitude of values
and lifestyles of others. It nevertheless deviates from Gergen’s post-
modernism in the sense that its emphasis would also be on a plurality
of life-dimensions while Gergen seems restricted to a structural one-
dimensionality (relationism) despite his emphasis on the plurality of
styles, values and so on. Relationism means that the self is confined
to only one of its many sides, namely the relations it has with other
selves. In fact, relationism actually makes us captives of the values
and life-styles of others without the ability (dimension) to resist or
creatively initiate and maintain our own life-style. In other words,
relationism makes it difficult for typical intra-individual traits like
reason, free will, creativity, instinct, and so on, to contribute to the
style, values and views of an individual. Relationism sees us as errants
between relations, doomed to live every new style imposed on us by
high-tech transportation and communication. The monism of rela-
tionism may weave the human unity of “being ready to accept every
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new style” — but this is the quick fix of homogenisation, which in
the end defeats the notion of plurality.
Of course, Gergen’s strong emphasis on the influence of others on
our identities is not without its value. The downside of individualism
and its dominating position within the modern version of the clas-
sical view of the self is its tendency not to recognise the social dimen-
sion as an “equal” one within what can be called the “human condi-
tion”. In other words, postmodern relationism has the value of once
again “adding” the relational dimension. This can be a quite valuable
move in the transformation of the classical view of the self in the
sense that the “human condition” is once again open for extra-indi-
vidual dimensions neglected or even oppressed by the modern self.
Taylor, for instance, is a theist with a tendency to add the religious
to his holistic view of the self. For this, he is severely criticised by
true modernists. But within the perspective of a dimensional anthro-
pology, greater sensitivity to what is sometimes also called the spiri-
tual dimension of human life will once again be possible.
It nevertheless remains difficult to “think” the coherence of the
plurality of dimensions. Even Taylor, with his strong emphasis on en-
gagement, finds it difficult to envision a truly holistic system of
equal human aspects because of the undue emphasis he puts on the
interpretational. However, the idea of a human being as a holistic
system opens up the possibility of seeing the human being as a plu-
rality of dimensions that prevents any single one from becoming the
sole originator and controller of the whole system. Of course, if one
believes in the teleological nature of this system, one will need some
concept of direction. It is, however, questionable to appoint one of
the dimensions as the fixed or sole director of human life. If this were
the case, the teleological system would lose its holistic character and
function according to the notion of an underlying substance from
where everything originates.
However, in place of a directionless self, we should consider all
aspects to have agency (an initiating capacity). Thus, depending on
the circumstances, an aspect can temporarily take a leading role in
the human system. This is something that Taylor (with his concept
of direction to a self) must endorse if his idea of the equal relation be-
tween the agent and his environment is taken into account.
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By using the concept of a dimensional anthropology I assume that
plurality consists of the dimensions of a unity and not of a fragmented
array of substances. But unity is not always visible, which makes it
hard to visualise. We should therefore settle for a “regulative idea” of
the unity of the self. This is not to resort to a metaphysical trans-
cendental self (the Cartesian version of the substantialisation of the
self) but to let the idea of unity hover on the borders of our thinking
to guide us in the search for avenues of engagement among the di-
mensions of our humanity.
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